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Abstract
We study the size of ﬁscal multipliers in response to a government spending shock under different
household leverage conditions in a general equilibrium setting with search and matching frictions.
We allow for different levels of household indebtedness by changing the intensive margin of bo-
rrowing (loan-to-value ratio), as well as the extensive margin, deﬁned as the number of borrowers
over total population. The interaction between the consumption decisions of agents with limited
access to credit and the process of wage bargaining and vacancy posting delivers two main results:
(a) higher initial leverage makes it more likely to ﬁnd output multipliers higher than one; and (b)
a positive government expenditure shock always produces a positive multiplier for vacancies and
employment. The latter result is in sharp contrast with models in which some households do not
have access to the ﬁnancial market (RoT consumers), in which the implied labor market responses
to ﬁscal shocks are inconsistent with the empirical evidence. We also ﬁnd that the impact on GDP of
consolidations is lower when consumers have a more limited capacity to borrow, and that increasing
government spending in an episode of intense private deleveraging can still generate positive and
signiﬁcant effects on consumption and output, although the ﬁscal output (employment) multiplier
decreases (increases) with the intensity of the credit crunch. In the model with indebted impatient
households we also observe that output (employment) multipliers decrease (increase) markedly
with the degree of shock persistence and increase with the degree of price stickiness.
Keywords: ﬁscal multipliers, private leverage, labour market search.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E24, E44, E62.
1. Introduction
Thecurrenteconomiccrisishasarousedarenewedinterestinﬁscalpolicyasastabilization
tool. For many years the predominant view of pundits in the ﬁeld, as represented by
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the so-called Jackson Hole consensus (see Bean et al, 2010), held that discretionary ﬁscal
stimulihadaneffectonoutputandemploymentrangingfromweaklypositivetonegative.
The only relevant use for this instrument should then be conﬁned to the role of automatic
stabilizers. This view changed rapidly during the early days of the ﬁnancial turmoil when
most academics and policy makers called for strong spending hikes and/or tax cuts to
keep the world economy from plunging into an even deeper recession. Two years later
many countries started to undo such ﬁscal actions, fearing the reaction of ﬁnancial markets
to the rapid surge of public debt all over the developed world. The discussion on the
output and employment effects of government spending stimuli -and the likely reaction of
the different economies to their withdrawal- has been central to the political and academic
debate over the last two years.1 This discussion has been going on for a long time now
on a broader scale, accumulating a substantial amount of international empirical evidence
in favor of each of the different views. This is reﬂected, for instance, in the IMF World
Economic Outlook (2010) and the results in Alesina and Ardagna (2010). While the IMF
report ﬁnds that discretionary cuts in public spending or tax hikes are contractionary with
a moderate but signiﬁcant effect on output and employment, Alesina and Ardagna (2010)
argue that ﬁscal contractions might even be expansionary under fairly general conditions,
and specially so in periods of ﬁscal stress and high public debt levels.
The positive effects of ﬁscal impulses that many authors ﬁnd in empirical research
are difﬁcult to accommodate in general equilibrium macroeconomic models, especially
with standard preferences and forward looking Ricardian consumers. Galí, López-Salido
and Vallés (2007) obtained ﬁscal multipliers consistent with the empirical evidence assum-
ing that a signiﬁcant proportion of the population does not have access to this intertem-
poral substitution. These households do not participate in the ﬁnancial market and their
consumption is simply equal to their disposable income. But the fact is that most agents
actually participate in the ﬁnancial market either as lenders or borrowers. Debt is the
key feature of the current ﬁnancial crisis that has taken most ﬁrms and households highly
leveraged with mortgages and other loans, after many years of ﬁnancial deepening linked
to the growing demand for housing. This is likely to affect their labor market choices, as
well as their consumption behavior, since these agents’ consumption is not only related
to their labor income, but also to their net worth and hence to the evolution of inﬂation,
interest rates, total debt and asset prices.
Some recent papers have pointed out the linkage between the presence of strongly
debt-constrained agents and the delivery of economic activity in the present slump. For
instance, Eggertsson and Krugman (2010) argue that under a credit crunch the economy is
1 See Romer and Bernstein (2009), Cogan, Cwik, Taylor and Wieland (2010) and Uhlig (2010), among others,
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likelytofallintotheliquiditytrapandthatmorepublicdebtcanbeanappropriatesolution
to a private debt-induced slump. In a fully speciﬁed dynamic model, Hall (2011) studies
the response of output and unemployment when the economy is hit by three adverse
forces related to the stock of housing, the number of liquidity constrained households
and the degree of ﬁnancial frictions. Furthermore, Mian and Suﬁ (2010) exploit county-
level data for the US and ﬁnd clear correlation between the growth of household leverage
from 2002 to 2006 and the fall in house prices and the rise in unemployment after the
crisis. Glick and Lansing (2010) also ﬁnd that the countries that experienced the largest
declines in household consumption, once house prices started falling after the ﬁnancial
crisis, were those that prior to 2007 suffered the highest increases in house prices and
household leverage.
In this paper we analyze the incidence of household leverage in the response of
consumption, (un)employment and output to discretionary ﬁscal measures within a DSGE
framework, an issue that has received scant attention to date2. We study the size of
ﬁscal multipliers paying special attention to the main determinants of consumption, labor
income and net worth, and to that end we augment the canonical neo-Keynesian model
in two directions. Since the dynamics of labor market variables is essential in the trans-
mission of ﬁscal impulses, we allow for two-sided market power, wage bargaining and
matching frictions in the vein of Andolfatto’s (1996) model. We also include ﬁnancial
frictions drawing on Iacoviello (2005). All agents in the economy participate in the ﬁnan-
cial market, but due to differences in their subjective valuation of the future, the most
impatient of them borrow from the patient ones. Since differences in discount factors are
deterministic, theamountofborrowingislimitedbythevalueofthecollateralgivenbythe
expected value of the household’s housing holding. Hence, even constrained consumers
leave some room for intertemporal substitution, such that a modiﬁed version of the Euler
condition on consumption still prevails.3.
The main results of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, under a fairly
standard characterization, the model delivers impulse response ﬁscal multipliers in line
with the empirical literature. In particular, while we obtain positive multipliers, the con-
sumption response is positive but lower than that predicted by the standard model with
rule-of-thumb (RoT) consumers. Second, our model predicts that vacancies and employ-
2 A non-exhaustive list of exceptions includes Callegari (2007), Roeger and int Veld (2009), Eggertsonn and
Krugman (2010) and Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011). Other approaches connect ﬁscal policy and ﬁnancial fric-
tions through the effect on the ﬁnancial premium paid by ﬁrms (see Fernández-Villaverde, 2010 and Carrillo and
Poilly, 2011).
3 In previous papers (Andrés and Arce, 2010, Andrés, Boscá and Ferri, 2011 and Boscá, Doménech and Ferri,
2011), we have looked at some of the mechanisms involved in our model. Here we extend this line of research
by analyzing the interaction between the consumption decisions of agents with limited access to credit and the
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ment will grow after a ﬁscal expansion, as observed in the data, while the RoT model
predicts the opposite. In the RoT model, the increase in wages is so strong that ﬁrms are
less inclined to post more vacancies and exploit the intensive margin by increasing hours
and reducing employment. Third, the greater the borrowing capacity (as measured by a
higher loan-to-value ratio), the stronger the impact multiplier of ﬁscal policy. Impatient
households borrow to the limit of their constraint, thus increasing their consumption
substantially when the loan-to-value ratio is high, contributing to a higher aggregate mul-
tiplier. Notice that this result can be read in two ways regarding the current policy debate.
With high leverage, multipliers are expected to be large because constrained consumers
ﬁnd it easy to borrow, but ﬁscal expansions lose strength after a credit crunch. Thus, pre-
crisis multipliers might not be a good indicator of the likely impact of ﬁscal policy after
the deterioration in the conditions under which households have access to credit.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the empirical
literature; section 3 summarizes the model; section 4 deals with calibration, while section
5 presents the main simulation results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Review of the empirical literature
In this section we present a non-exhaustive review of the main results in the literature
regarding the impact of ﬁscal policies on the following variables: output, consumption,
(un)employment and vacancies. Investment and real wages play an important role in the
transmission of ﬁscal shocks, but their response is less controversial and can be easily
reproduced in a broad class of macroeconomic models.
The empirical analysis of the ﬁscal multiplier gathered momentum after the work
of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), who estimated a VAR for the US economy with a careful
identiﬁcationapproachtotheeffectofdiscretionaryﬁscalpolicychanges. Theyfoundthat,
consistent with a Keynesian view, output and consumption increase while investment falls
in response to a positive government spending shock. These results are consistent with
those obtained by Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), Fatás and Mihov (2001), Galí,
López-Salido and Vallés (2007) and Perotti (1999), among others. Using a similar method-
ology Perotti (2004) found coincident results for these variables for Australia, Canada,
the United Kingdom and Germany. Mountford and Uhlig (2009) use a sign restriction
methodology to identify the effects of ﬁscal shocks and ﬁnd that private consumption
does not change signiﬁcantly in response to an unexpected increase in government spend-
ing. Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) and McGrattan
and Ohanian (2003) have focussed on particular and well identiﬁed episodes of military
spending increases in the United States and conclude that such ﬁscal expansions have a
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Incontrastwiththeseresults, anotherstreamoftheliteraturehasfoundthatcontrac-
tionary policies have expansionary effects on output, i.e. that ﬁscal policy may have non-
Keynesian effects. Beginning with the work of Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), many studies
have analyzed the macroeconomic effect of ﬁscal consolidations. In their survey for this
literature, Hemming, Kell and Mahfouz (2002) conclude that there are many examples in
which ﬁscal contractions have had expansionary effects on output, private consumption
and investment. As Perotti (1999) found, the initial conditions of some key variables can
explain why ﬁscal expansions have a positive effect in ’good times’ but a negative one in
’bad times’, when ﬁscal consolidations are needed.
The ﬁnancial crisis has aroused renewed interest in the effects of ﬁscal policy as the
debate involving Romer and Bernstein (2009), Cogan, Cwik, Taylor and Wieland (2010),
Uhlig (2010) and Taylor (2011) demonstrates. Alesina and Ardagna (2010) ﬁnd that there
isalmostthesameprobabilityoftheeffectofﬁscalstimuliresultinginanoutputexpansion
as in a contraction and that the outcome depends crucially on the particular components
of government spending and taxes that change. Barro and Redlick (2009) measure the
impact of ﬁscal policy by looking at very long series for the US and a careful identiﬁcation
procedure focusing on the role of military spending. They ﬁnd small consumption multi-
pliers leading to output multipliers of approximately 0.4-0.7. Interestingly, they ﬁnd that
changes in tax revenue have a smaller impact on output than variations in the marginal
tax rate; they conclude that labor supply dominates aggregate demand as a mechanism
for the transmission of ﬁscal shocks. Romer and Romer (2009, 2010), following a narrative
approach, ﬁnd strong output responses to tax changes in the US. The same approach has
inspired the recent work by Leigh et al. (2010), who have looked at many episodes in a
broad sample of developed countries and ﬁnd that, albeit small, output multipliers are
unambiguously positive and that ﬁscal contraction has a negative impact on output.
Some authors have looked to other determinants of the effectiveness of ﬁscal poli-
cies. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010) estimate state-dependent ﬁscal multipliers,
documenting a higher effectiveness of government spending shocks in recessions than in
expansions. Still, important differences between historical episodes are lumped together
by these authors. There is widespread consensus about the importance of the monetary
policy reaction to ﬁscal shocks as a major determinant of the size of the multipliers (Wood-
ford, 2010), which become unusually large if the economy hits the zero bound of the
nominal interest rate (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 2009).
Our interpretation of the literature is that ﬁscal expansions generally have a posi-
tive, albeit not too large effect on output. This idea is also supported by the recent survey
of Ramey (2011) who offers a range between 0.8 and 1.5 for the output multiplier corres-
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the ﬁscal multiplier is difﬁcult to gauge. Tagkalakis (2008) ﬁnds empirical support, using
a panel of nineteen OECD countries, for the idea that ﬁscal policy can have asymmetric
effects on consumption in recessions and expansions in the presence of binding liquidity
constraints. ThepapersbyCaldaraandKamps(2008), Coenenetal. (2010)andCoganetal.
(2010) are cited by Leeper (2010) as a proof of the difﬁculty of producing a simple answer
to the question of whether, or to what extent, ﬁscal policy is effective as a stabilization
tool, a situation he calls the "ﬁscal morass". Also, in their empirical survey, Spilimbergo
et al. (2009) ﬁnd that "the size of the ﬁscal multiplier is country-, time-, and circumstance-
speciﬁc". A similar result is reached in the papers by both Ilzetski et al. (2011) and
Favero et al. (2011). They conclude that the impact of government expenditure shocks
or ﬁscal consolidation depends crucially on key country characteristics, such as the level
of development, exchange rate regime, openness to trade, public debt dynamics and ﬁscal
reaction functions.
Less attention has been paid to the effect of ﬁnancial conditions on the ﬁscal mul-
tiplier. As regards the role of ﬁnancial conditions, Afonso, Baxa and Slavik (2011) report
evidence of nonlinearities in the effects of ﬁscal shocks on economic activity depending on
a set of initial conditions determined by the existence of ﬁnancial stress, diverse levels of
government indebtedness and different implicitly assumed monetary policy behavior.
The ultimate effects of ﬁscal expansions on the economy crucially depend on the
reaction of employment. Despite that, the response of labor market variables to ﬁscal
shocks has received less attention in the literature. However, the scant empirical literature
on this issue points towards a government spending shock having a positive effect on
vacancies and employment and a negative effect on unemployment (see Monacelli, Perotti
and Trigari, 2010, and Ravn and Simonelli, 2008). Using a different sample span, Brückner
and Pappa (2010) ﬁnd a positive effect on employment, although the unemployment rate
may not fall due to an increase in the participation rate.
The model we describe in the next section explores the connection of consumption
and output ﬁscal multipliers with the ﬁnancial conditions of the economy as represented
by the degree of household indebtedness. The economic mechanism explaining the mag-
nitude of the ﬁscal multiplier depends crucially on the labor market reactions of economic
agents to the ﬁscal shock.
3. The model
We model a decentralized closed economy in which households and ﬁrms trade one ﬁ-
nal good and two factors of production: productive capital and labor. While capital is
exchanged in a perfectly competitive market, the labor market is non-Walrasian. Besides
labor and capital, households own all the ﬁrms operatingin the economy. Households rentHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 7
capital and labor services to ﬁrms and receive income in the form of interest and wages.
Firms post new vacancies every period, paying a ﬁxed cost while the vacancy remains
unﬁlled. The fact that trade in the labor market is costly, in terms of resources and time,
generates a monopoly rent associated with each job match. It is assumed that workers
and ﬁrms bargain over these monopoly rents in Nash fashion. Each household is made
up of working-age agents who may be either employed or unemployed. If unemployed,
agents are actively searching for a job. Firm investment in vacant posts is endogenously
determined and so are job inﬂows. Job destruction is considered exogenous.
The model goes one step beyond Mankiw’s model of savers and spenders (Mankiw,
2000). As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005), there are two types of
representative households, Nl
t of them are patient and Nb
t are impatient. All have access to
the ﬁnancial market and patient households are characterized by having a lower discount
rate than impatient ones. This ensures that in the steady-state, and under fairly general
conditions, patient households are net lenders and the owners of physical capital, while
impatient households are net borrowers. Due to some underlying friction in the ﬁnancial
market, borrowers face a binding constraint in the amount of credit they can take, which
is given by the expected real value of their real estate holdings. Houses are assumed to
be the only collateralizable asset. The size of the working-age population is given by
Nt = Nl
t + Nb
t . Let 1 ￿ tb and tb denote the proportions of lenders and borrowers in
the working-age population; these shares are assumed to be constant over time, unless
otherwise stated. For simplicity, we assume no growth in the working-age population.
3.1 Patient households
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Lower case variables in the maximization problem above are normalized by the within
group working-age population (Nl
t). In our notation, variables and parameters indexed
by b and l denote, respectively, impatient and patient households. Non-indexed variables
apply indistinctly to both types of households. Thus cl
t,xl
t,nl
t￿1 and (1 ￿ nl
t￿1) represent
consumption, housing holdings, the employment rate and the unemployment rate of pa-
tient households. The time endowment is normalized to one. l1t and l2 are hours worked
per employee and hours devoted to job seeking by the unemployed. As we will explain
later while the household bargains over l1t, the amount of time devoted to job seeking
(l2) is assumed to be exogenous, such that individual households take it as given. Future
utility is discounted at a rate of bl 2 (0,1), the parameter ￿ 1
h measures the negative of
the Frisch elasticity of the labor supply and fx is the weight of housing in life-time utility.
The subjective value of leisure imputed by workers may vary across employment statuses
(f1 6= f2).
Maximization of (1) is constrained as follows. First, the budget constraint (2) descri-
bes the various sources and uses of income. The term wtnl
t￿1l1t captures net labor income
earned by the fraction of employed workers, where wt stands for hourly real wages. There
are three assets in the economy. First, private physical capital (kl
t), which is owned solely
by patient households who get rt￿1kl
t￿1 in return, where rt represents the gross return
on physical capital. Given that ﬁrms make extraordinary proﬁts, we assume that lenders
receive these in the form of dividends dl
t. Second, there are loans/debt in the economy.
Thus, patient households lend in real terms ￿bl
t (or borrow bl
t) to the private sector and
￿b
p
t to the public sector. They receive back ￿(1+ rn
t￿1)bl
t￿1 from the private sector, where
rn
t￿1 is the nominal interest rate on loans between t ￿ 1 and t. Notice that in the budget





reﬂects the assumption that debt contracts are set in nominal terms. Third, there is a







investment by patient households, where qt is the real housing price.













Total investment outlays are affected by increasing marginal costs of installation. There
4 As in Iacoviello (2005), the assumption of an aggregate ﬁxed housing stock is not crucial to the propagation
mechanism of shocks in the economy.HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 9



















The remaining constraints faced by Ricardian households concern the laws of mo-
tion for capital and employment. Each period private capital stock kl
t￿1 depreciates at the
exogenous rate d and is accumulated through investment jl
t. Thus, it evolves according
to (3). Employment obeys the law of motion (4), where nl
t￿1 and (1 ￿ nl
t￿1) respectively
denote the fraction of employed and unemployed optimizing workers in the economy at
the beginning of period t. Each period, jobs are destroyed at the exogenous rate s. Like-
wise, new employment opportunities come at the rate rw
t , which represents the probability
that one unemployed worker will ﬁnd a job. Although the job-ﬁnding rate rw
t is taken
as exogenous by individual workers, at aggregate level it is endogenously determined
according to the following Cobb-Douglas matching function5,
rw




where vt stands for the number of active vacancies during period t.
Given the recursive structure of the above problem, it may be equivalently rewritten
in terms of a dynamic program. Thus, the value function W(Wl




































where maximization is subject to constraints (2), (3) and (4). The solution to the optimiza-
tionprogramabovegeneratesthefollowingﬁrst-orderconditionsforconsumption, capital




























































































According to condition (7) the current marginal utility of consumption is the inverse of
actual consumption. Expression (8) ensures that the intertemporal reallocation of capital
cannot improve the household’s utility. Equation (9) states that investment is undertaken
to the extent that the opportunity cost of a marginal increase in investment in terms of
consumptionisequaltoitsmarginalexpectedcontributiontothehousehold’sutility. Euler
condition (10) means that variations across periods in the marginal utility of consumption
are coherent with the discount rate and existing real interest rates. Finally, expression (11)
represents the dynamics of the demand for housing.

























ht measures the marginal contribution of a newly created job to the utility of the
household. The ﬁrst term captures the value of the cash-ﬂow generated by the new job
in t, i.e. the labor income measured according to its utility value in terms of consumption
(ll
1t). The second term on the right-hand side of (12) represents the net utility arising from
the newly created job. Finally, the third term represents the "capital value" of an additional
employed worker, given that the employment status will persist in the future, conditional
to the probability that the new job will not be lost.
3.2 Impatient households
Impatienthouseholdsdiscountthefuturemoreheavilythanpatientones, sotheirdiscountHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 11

































subject to the speciﬁc liquidity constraint, a borrowing limit and the law of motion of











































t￿1/2 denotes the housing adjustment cost. Both
the parameter fx, which accounts for housing weight in life-time utility, and the housing
adjustment function are the same as those for patient households.
Notice that restrictions (14) and (16) are analogous to those for patient individuals
(with the exception that impatient households do not accumulate physical capital). In
the mortgage market, the maximum loan that an individual can get is a fraction of the
liquidation value of the amount of housing held by the representative household; thus
mb 2 [0,1] in (15) represents the loan-to-value ratio. As shown in Iacoviello (2005), without
uncertainty the assumption bb < bl guarantees that the borrowing constraint holds with
equality.
In the case of impatient households, the value function W(Wb


































where maximization is subject to constraints (14), (15) and (16). The solution to the opti-

























































t is the Lagrange multiplier of the borrowing constraint and the marginal value of
employment for an impatient household worker (lb























which can be interpreted in the same way as that of patient households.
3.3 Aggregation
Aggregate consumption and employment are a weighted average of the corresponding
















t + (1￿ tb)bl
t = 0 (24)
tbxb
t + (1￿ tb)xl
t = X (25)
where X is the ﬁxed stock of real estate in the economy. For the variables that exclusively













In addition, we consider an aggregator (trade union) that combines the surpluses
from employment of both types of households, in terms of consumption, and use this





















where we also assume that transfers are distributed according to the population size in
each group such that trhb
t = trhl










use labor and capital to produce a homogenous good that is sold in a competitive ﬂexible
price market at a price Pw
t ; (2) the homogenous good is bought by ﬁrms (indexed by e j)
in the intermediate sector and converted, without the use of any other input, into a ﬁrm-
speciﬁc variety that is sold in a monopolistically competitive market, in which prices are
sticky; (3) ﬁnally there is a competitive retail aggregator that buys differentiated varieties
(ye jt) and sells a homogeneous ﬁnal good (yt) at price Pt.
The competitive retail sector
The competitive retail aggregator buys differentiated goods from ﬁrms in the intermediate
sector and sells a homogeneous ﬁnal good yt at price Pt. Each variety ye jt is purchased at a





Pe jtye jtde j










where q > 1 is a parameter that can be expressed in terms of the elasticity of substitution
between intermediate goods { ￿ 0, as q = (1+{)/{. The ﬁrst-order condition gives us


















The monopolistically competitive intermediate sector
The monopolistically competitive intermediate sector comprises e j = 1,...e J ﬁrms each of
which buys the production of competitive wholesale ﬁrms at a common price Pw
t and sells
a differentiated variety ye jt at price Pe jt to the ﬁnal competitive retailing sector described
above. Variety producers stagger prices. Following Calvo (1983), only some ﬁrms set their
prices optimally each period. Those ﬁrms that do not reset their prices optimally at t adjust
them according to a simple indexation rule to catch up with lagged inﬂation. Thus, each
period a proportion w of ﬁrms simply set Pe jt = (1+ pt￿1)
V Pe jt￿1 (with V representing the
degree of indexation and pt￿1 the inﬂation rate in t￿1). The fraction of ﬁrms (of measure
1￿w) that set the optimal price at t seek to maximize the present value of expected proﬁts.
Consequently, 1￿ w represents the probability of adjusting prices each period, whereas w
can be interpreted as a measure of price rigidity. Thus, the maximization problem of the












e jtpt+sye jt+s ￿ Pt+smce jt,t+s
￿
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where P￿










t+s represents the real marginal cost (inverse mark-up) borne at t + j
by the ﬁrm that last set its price in period t, Pw
t+s the price of the good produced by the
wholesale competitive sector, kf is an entry cost which ensures that extraordinary proﬁts
vanish in imperfectly-competitive equilibrium, and Lt,t+s is a price kernel which captures










































Taking into account (31) and that q is assumed time invariant, the corresponding













From (31) and (36) we can obtain an expression for aggregate inﬂation of the form,





1+Vb and $ =
(1￿bw)(1￿w)
w(1+Vb) .
The competitive wholesale sector
The competitive wholesale sector consists of j = 1,...J ﬁrms each selling a different quan-
tity of a homogeneous good at the same price Pw
t to the monopolistically competitive
intermediate sector. Firms in the perfectly competitive wholesale sector carry out the
actual production using labor and capital. Factor demands are obtained by solving the
















t￿1(nt￿1l1t)a ￿ kf (38)
nt = (1￿ s)nt￿1 + r
f
t vt (39)
where, in accordance with the ownership structure of the economy, future proﬁts are







of the patient household. Producers use two
inputs, private capital and labor, combined in a standard Cobb-Douglas constant-returns-
to-scale production function. r
f
t is the probability that a vacancy will be ﬁlled in any given
period t. It is worth noting that the probability of ﬁlling a vacant post r
f
t is exogenous
from the perspective of the ﬁrm. However, as far as the overall economy is concerned,
this probability is endogenously determined according to the following Cobb-Douglas
matching function:
rw
t (1￿ nt￿1) = r
f




We can express the maximum expected value of the ﬁrm in state W
f
t as a function
V(W
f
t ) that satisﬁes the following Bellman equation:
V(W
f
t ) = max
kt,vt
(










The solution to the optimization program above generates the following ﬁrst-order condi-
tions for private capital and the number of vacancies
















where the demand for private capital is determined by (42). It is positively related to
the marginal productivity of capital (1 ￿ a)
yt+1
kt which, in equilibrium, must equate the
gross return on physical capital. Expression (43) reﬂects that ﬁrms choose the number of
vacancies in such a way that the marginal recruiting cost per vacancy, kv, is equal to the










Using the Bellman equation, the marginal value of an additional job in t for a ﬁrm















where the marginal contribution of a new job to proﬁts equals the marginal product net
of the wage rate, plus the capital value of the new job in t, corrected for the probability























3.5 Trade in the labor market: the labor contract
The key departure of search models from the competitive paradigm is that trading in the
labor market is subject to transaction costs. Each period, the unemployed engage in job
seeking activities in order to ﬁnd vacant posts spread over the economy. A costly search
in the labor market implies that there are simultaneous ﬂows into and out of the state of
employment, so an increase (reduction) in the stock of unemployment results from the
predominance of job losses (creation) over job creation (losses). Stable unemployment
occurs whenever inﬂows and outﬂows cancel each other out, i.e.,
r
f
t vt = rw
t (1￿ nt￿1) = c1v
c2
t [(1￿ nt￿1)l2]
1￿c2 = snt￿1 (46)
As it takes time (for households) and real resources (for ﬁrms) to make proﬁtable
contacts, some pure economic rent emerges with each new job, which is equal to the sum
of the expected transaction (search) costs the ﬁrm and the worker will further incur if they
refuse to match. The emergence of such rent gives rise to a bilateral monopoly framework.
Once a representative job-seeking worker and vacancy-offering ﬁrm match, they negotiate
a labor contract in hours and wages. There is risk-sharing at the household level and
hence consumption within each household type is independent of the employment status.
Although patient and impatient households may have different reservation wages, they
delegate the bargain process with ﬁrms to trade unions. This trade union maximizes the
aggregate marginal value of employment for workers (28) and distributes employment ac-
cording to their shares in the working-age population. The implication of this assumption
is that all workers receive the same wage, work the same number of hours and suffer the
same unemployment rates6. Thus, following standard practice, the Nash bargain process
6 Instead of relying on a trade union, we could have used the notion of collective bargaining on a single con-HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 18

























where lw 2 [0,1] reﬂects workers’ bargaining power. The ﬁrst term in brackets represents
the worker’s surplus (as a weighted average of borrowers’ and lenders’ surpluses), while





the earning premium (in terms of consumption) of employment over unemployment for a
patient and an impatient worker.
The solution of the Nash maximization problem gives the optimal real wage and


























































Unlike the Walrasian outcome, the wage prevailing in the search equilibrium is related
(although not equal) to the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure and
the marginal productivity of labor, depending on worker bargaining power lw. Putting
aside the last term on the right hand side, the wage is a weighted average of the highest
feasible wage (i.e., the marginal productivity of labor plus hiring costs per unemployed
worker) and the outside option (i.e., the reservation wage as given by the difference be-
tween the utility of leisure of an unemployed person and an employed worker). This
reservation wage is, in turn, a weighted average of the lowest acceptable wage of both
types of workers. They differ in the marginal utility of consumption (ll
1t and lb
1t). If the
marginal utility of consumption is high, the workers are ready to accept a relatively low
wage.
tract to avoid multi-person Nash bargaining with asymmetric information on outside options. In any case, our
approach makes it possible to circumvent problems associated with incentives for workers to reveal preferences
and ﬁrms to perform screening. In addition, as Stähler and Thomas (2011) show in a model with RoT consumers,
assuming individual bargaining between each worker and the ﬁrm does not change the steady-state results at all
and only slightly changes the dynamics of wages.HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 19
The third term on the right hand side of (48) is part of the reservation wage that
depends only on the existence of impatient workers (only if tb > 0 this term is different
from zero). It can be interpreted as an inequality term in utility. The economic intuition
is as follows: impatient consumers are constrained by their collateral requirements so
that they are not allowed to use their entire wealth to smooth consumption over time.
However, they can take advantage of the fact that a match today will continue with some
probability (1￿ s) in the future, yielding a labor income that in turn will be used to
consume tomorrow. Therefore, they use the margin that hours and wage negotiation
provide them to improve their lifetime utility, by narrowing the gap in utility with respect
to patient consumers. In this sense, they compare the discounted intertemporal mar-
























the third term in (48) is positive, which indicates that impatient workers
put additional pressure on the average reservation wage as a way to ease their period-by-
period constraint in consumption. The size of this inequality term is positively related to







, because it increases the value
of a match to continue in the future, and negatively related to the job ﬁnding probability
(rw
t ), that reduces the loss of breaking up the match. Finally, notice that when tb = 0, all
consumers are patient and, therefore, the solutions for the wage rate and hours simplify to
the standard ones (see Andolfatto, 2004).
3.6 Policy instruments and the accounting identity


















where y and rn are steady-state levels of output and interest rate, respectively. The para-
meter rR captures the extent of interest rate inertia, and rp and ry represent the weights
given by the central bank to inﬂation and output objectives. Finally, to close the model,
output is deﬁned as the sum of demand components.
yt = Atk1￿a









+ gt + kvvt (51)
Government revenues and expenditures each period are made consistent by meansHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 20
of the intertemporal budget constraint





where trht stands for lump-sum transfers/taxes. In order to enforce the government’s
intertemporal budget constraint, the following ﬁscal policy reaction function is imposed
























. The value of y2 > 0 is chosen to ensure a smooth adjustment of current debt
towards its steady-state level.
4. Calibration
Parameters from previous studies
The benchmark is calibrated using standard values in the literature for some parameters
and matching some relevant data moments for the US economy. Thus, we take the value
from Iacoviello (2005) for the subjective intertemporal discount rate of patient households,
bl = 0.99, the subjective discount rate of impatient households, bb = 0.95, the adjustment
cost for housing capital fh = 0.0 and the value tb = 0.36 for the fraction of impatient
consumers in the economy. In keeping with the results estimated in Iacoviello and Neri
(2010), we choose the two values for the loan-to-value ratio that characterize the low and
high indebtedness regime: mb = 0.735 and mb = 0.985 respectively. We take a very
standard value for the Cobb-Douglas parameter a = 0.7. We take the depreciation rate
of physical capital d = 0.025 and the elasticity of matching to vacant posts c2 = 0.5
from Monacelli et al (2010), whereas the exogenous transition rate from employment to
unemployment, s = 0.15, comes from Andolfatto (1996) and Cheron and Langot (2004).
These authors also provide some average steady-state values, such as the probability of a
vacant position becoming a productive job, which is assumed to be rf = 0.9, the fraction
of time spent working, l1 = 1/3, and the fraction of time households spend searching
l2 = 1/6. The long-run employment ratio is computed to be n = 0.75 as in Choi and
Rios-Rull (2008). Furthermore, we assume that equilibrium unemployment is socially-
efﬁcient (see Hosios, 1990) and, as such, lw = 0.5 is equal to 1￿ c2. For the intertemporal







is equal to 1, the same as in Andolfatto (1996). TheHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 21
adjustment costs parameter for productive investment f = 5.95, is taken from QUEST
II, which considers the same function as ours for capital installation costs. Parameters
affecting the New Phillips Curve are also standard in the literature. We set a value of
q = 6 for the elasticity of ﬁnal goods implying a steady state markup of q
q￿1 = 1.2. Hence,
the steady state value for the marginal cost is obtained as mc = q￿1
q . The probability of
not changing prices, w, is set to 0.75, meaning that prices change every four quarters on
average, whereas we take an intermediate value, V = 0.4, for inﬂation indexation.
Calibrated parameters from steady-state relationships
We normalize both steady-state output (y) and real housing prices (q) to one. Steady-
state government expenditure g/y, is set to 17 per cent of output (US Bureau of Economic
Analysis data for 2009). We obtain the long-run value for vacancies from (46) v = sn/rf.
Then, we calibrate the ratio of recruiting expenditures to output (kvv/y) to represent 0.5
percentage points of output, as in Cheron and Langot (2004) or Choi and Rios-Rull (2008),
and very close to the value of 0.44 implied by the calibration of Monacelli, Perotti and
Trigari (2010). From this ratio we obtain a value of kv = 0.04 and using the steady-state
version of equation (45), we can solve for the value of wages (w). The steady-state value
of matching ﬂows in the economy equals the ﬂow of jobs that are lost (sn) and we use
the equality (sn = c1vc2 [(1￿ n)l2]
1￿c2) to solve for the scale parameter of the matching
function c1 = 1.56.
The the long-run value of total factor productivity, A = 1.521, is calibrated from








, the return on capital (r) from (8) and the steady-state value for the capital stock
(k) from (42). The capital stock together with the depreciation rate and the adjustment cost
parameter allow us to calculate the value of gross investment for the steady state, and,
using (51), the level of consumption c. The steady-state value of the nominal interest rate
rn, is related to the intertemporal discount rate of lenders through the steady-state version
of equation (10). The value for the transfers in the steady-state trh are such that from (52)
the resulting debt to output ratio is 60 per cent on annual terms. In order to compute kf,













Let gl be the ratio of assets of patient households in the steady-state to total output
(b
l
= gly) and conditional to the value of gl, we can obtain the steady-state values ofHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 22
several variables. Equation (24) yields b
b
. Next, we can compute the steady-state level of
consumption of borrowers cb, from the budget restriction (14) and the consumption level
of lenders cl, from the aggregation equation (22). Our next step consists in calibrating





1, from their respective ﬁrst-order conditions in equations (7) and (18). We can
then obtain the borrowers’ steady-state housing holdings xb from (15), and the long-run
equilibrium value of the collateral constraint shadow price mb from (19). This makes it
possible to compute the parameter that accounts for the housing weight in life-time utility
fx, from the last ﬁrst-order condition of borrowers’ optimization program (equation (20)).
The value of the parameter fx enables us to compute the steady-state holdings of housing
for lenders xl, from the ﬁrst order condition (11), and the ﬁxed stock of real estate in the
economy X, from the aggregation rule (25). Notice that the values we obtain for fx and
X depend on the value we assign to the ratio of assets of patient households in the steady
state to total output gl. In order to produce a sensible calibration of this parameter and the
steady-state level of the variables, we follow Iacoviello (2005) and choose a value for gl,
such that the total stock of housing over yearly output is 140 per cent. The resulting value
for fx is 0.10.
As regards preference parameters in the household utility function, f1 = 1.595 is
calculated from the steady-state version of expression (49). A system of three equations





resulting value for f2 is 1.043. Therefore the calibrated values for f1 and f2 are similar to
those in Andolfatto (1996) and other related research in the literature. Such values imply
that the value for leisure imputed by an employed worker is well above that imputed by
an unemployed worker.
Shocks and policy rule parameters
The parameters rR = 0.73 and rp = 0.27 in the interest rate rule are taken from Iacoviello
(2005). We choose a value of 0, for the parameter measuring the interest rate reaction to
output ry, and assume y1 = 0.01 and y2 = 0.2 for the ﬁscal rule. Finally, the government
expenditure shock persistence rg is equal to 0.75, as in Brückner and Pappa (2010).
5. Results
5.1 Fiscal policy in models with ﬁnancially restricted consumers.
In this subsection we present impulse-response functions to a (one per cent of GDP) tran-
sitory public expenditure shock of some key macroeconomic variables: output, consump-HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 23
tion, realwages, hoursperworker, unemploymentandvacancies7. Theaimofthisexercise
is to compare the effects of the ﬁscal shock under three different modeling strategies: a
basic search model with homogeneous consumers8, a search model with a 0.36 share of
RoT consumers9 and a search model with indebted consumers (0.36 share of impatient
consumers and a loan-to-value ratio of 0.985). All models share price rigidity that lasts for
four quarters.
The results are depicted in Figure 1. The output response to the public consumption
shock is positive in all three models. However, the expansionary effect varies substantially
across models, ranging from a high impact multiplier near 2 per cent in the RoT model,
to approximately 0.8 points in the basic search model with Ricardian consumers and an
intermediate value of around 1.2 per cent in an economy with credit constrained individ-
uals. These differences in output multipliers are explained by the different responses of
consumption across models. In a standard search model, populated only with optimizing
individuals, the consumption response to the ﬁscal shock is negative (impact consumption
multiplier of around ￿0.2), due to the negative wealth effect associated with expectations
of future tax rises to ﬁnance the increase in government expenditure. On the contrary,
the consumption response in the search model augmented with RoT consumers is highly
positive (approximately 1.8 per cent on impact). Finally, in the model with borrowing
restrictions, the impact on consumption is positive (around 0.4 points), but more modest
than in the presence of households that do not participate in the ﬁnancial market.
In order to gain some economic intuition from this result it is worth looking at the






















7 In this paper we do not assess the dynamic properties of the model. In a companion paper we conduct an
exhaustive analysis of a similar model subject to technology shocks and ﬁnd that the proposed structure matches
the data moments of most labor market variables, both before and after the mortgage market deregulation in the
80s (Andrés, Boscá and Ferri, 2011).
8 Our benchmark model with impatient consumers that are credit constrained can be tranformed into a stan-
dard search and matching model with homogeneous consumers by setting tb = 0.
9 Eliminating preferences for housing from the utility function (fx = 0), setting the temporal discount rate
bb = bl and assuming that a share of households, tb ,consume just their current income converts the benchmark
model into a serch model with a tb share of RoT consumers.HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 24































































Figure 1: Effects of a transitory public consumption shock: basic search model,

















they allocate their wealth optimally across time depending on income expectations and
the real interest rate. RoT household consumption responds one-to-one to changes in their
labor income (wtl1nRoT
t￿1) every period (55). The consumption possibilities of impatient
households (56) are determined not only by their current labor income but also by their
net worth 10. Net worth, (57), is deﬁned as the value of households’ asset holdings net
of debt. As a consequence of the ﬁscal stimulus, the negative wealth effect on lenders
pulls the price of assets down, more than offsetting the capital gains on outstanding debt
caused by higher but sluggish inﬂation. The negative response of net worth weakens the
consumptionresponseofleveragedagentsascomparedwiththatoffullyconstrainednon-
leveraged agents. Alternatively we can explain this result by looking at the reaction of the
borrowing limit (15) after the ﬁscal shock. Both the (current and expected) deterioration in
the relative price of houses qt, and the increase in the real interest rate reduce the amount
of credit that impatient consumers can obtain in the market. The negative ﬁnancial impact
of the ﬁscal shock on indebted households (either reﬂected in their net worth or in their
borrowing possibilities) dampens the reaction of their consumption11.
This pattern of consumption responses is essential to understand the differences
in the dynamics of the main labor market variables. The increase in aggregate demand







and the demand for labor (49). Also, the increase in consumption of con-
strained agents raises their demand for leisure, thus reinforcing the relative bargaining
power of the union (48), which results in a substantial wage rise. This effect is signiﬁ-
cantly smaller in the basic search model, in which the increase in the marginal utility of
consumption of Ricardian consumers weakens their bargaining position.
Thequantitativedifferencesattheintensivemargin(averagehours)leadtoopposite
predictions regarding the response of the extensive margin, vacancies and unemployment,
as depicted in the ﬁnal row of plots in Figure 1. Large increases in wages and hours
10 Equation (56) is as an approximation that holds exactly under linear preferences on labor supply and a
frictionless labor market. In the presence of search and matching frictions the marginal propensity to consume
(Q) is not constant, but varies over the cycle (see Appendix 1).
11 As we shall discuss later, the size of this net worth effect hinges crucially upon the value of mb.HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 26
worked discourage new vacancy posting and reduce total employment as in the RoT
model, whereas in both the pure search model and in the model with leveraged house-
holds unemployment falls. In order to understand these different responses we must
look at the dynamic response of the
Pw
t
Pt ratio which is a key determinant of the vacancy
posting decision. The RoT model generates large swings in this ratio that ﬁrst rises, due
to the sluggish response of aggregate prices, Pt, and then falls sharply as aggregate prices
start increasing following the strong increase in consumption on impact. This reduces the
incentive to post vacancies (see equation (45)), which in turn contributes to generating
higher unemployment12. The response of the marginal cost is much more muted in the





above the steady-state value, encouraging vacancy posting and reducing unemployment.
The previous analysis can be summarized as follows. First, it is possible to ob-
tain a Keynesian output multiplier for government expenditure (a multiplier higher than
one) and a positive response of aggregate private consumption in a model characterized
by the presence of impatient consumers that participate in ﬁnancial markets. In that
case, the consumption response is positive, but lower than that predicted by the standard
model with rule-of-thumb consumers. Therefore, macroeconomic models that use RoT
consumers may be exacerbating the effects of ﬁscal policy. Second, while the use of RoT
consumers has become accepted in DSGE models on the basis of their ability to match a
positive correlation between consumption and government spending, they may generate
results in terms of the reaction of some labor market variables, in particular vacancies
and unemployment, that are at odds with what is observed in the data. Thus, although
some departure from the pure intertemporal substitution model is needed to generate
sound effects of ﬁscal innovations, the role of private leverage is vital to improve our
understanding of both the output and unemployment ﬁscal multipliers. Neither too much
nor the absence of intertemporal substitution seem realistic settings to study complex
issues such as those involved in the reaction to ﬁscal shocks. In what follows we look
at the role of the determinants of private indebtedness in more detail.
5.2 Fiscal policy and private indebtedness.
We now turn our attention to the study of the impact of the degree of private indebtedness
on the magnitude of ﬁscal multipliers. Figure (2) depicts the impact ﬁscal multipliers of
our variables of interest as a function of the share of borrowers (tb) and for two different
values of the loan-to-value (a low mb = 0.735 and a high mb = 0.985). These parametric
12 Pt+1 is expected to rise as prices in the non-competitive sector begin to adjust. The opposite is expected for
Pw
t+1 due to a sharp decrease in wages and an increase in unemployment, which drag consumption and aggregate
demand down.HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 27
changes in the intensive (loan-to-value ratio) and extensive (share of borrowers in total
population) borrowing margins capture variations in the amount of household indebt-
edness in the economy. We deﬁne the ﬁscal multiplier on a variable x ($x) as the ratio
between the initial change in the variable from its steady state
￿
x0, and the initial variation
of government spending
￿






The results in Figure 2 indicate that the ﬁscal multipliers to a transitory government
expenditure shock are very sensitive to the degree of private indebtedness of the economy.
When the borrowing capacity of borrowers is high (high loan-to-value ratio) the output
multiplier (ﬁrst column, second row in the ﬁgure) is less than one only if the share of
borrowers in the population is very low (less than 25 per cent). However, increasing the
share of restricted consumers makes the output multiplier grow steadily to values around
1.75 when half of the population is subject to borrowing constraints. On the contrary, if
the loan-to-value is low (mb = 0.735), the impact output multiplier is always less than
one, no matter what the share of borrowers in the economy. Output behavior can be
better understood by looking at the response of aggregate consumption to the shock. The
borrowing capacity of an impatient household, and hence its consumption possibilities,
increases with the loan-to-value ratio, which is reﬂected in the vertical distance, for a given
share of borrowers, between the two lines depicting borrowers’ consumption. Addition-
ally, the share of impatient households in the population tb, positively affects the response
of aggregate consumption to the shock. This is due to a two-fold effect. On the one
hand, a higher tb puts additional pressure on wages, increasing borrowers’ income and
consumption. On the other hand, tb directly affects the weight of borrowers’ consumption
in aggregate consumption. Notice that in the wage equation the inﬂuence of tb is more
intense the higher the loan-to-value ratio, because tb is multiplying the inverse of the
marginal utility of consumption, 1
lb
1t
(which increases with mb). As a result the impact of
the ﬁscal shock on wages, consumption and output increases faster with tb when mb is
high.
The pattern of wages and hours worked closely mimics that of the consumption
of constrained households. When the impact multiplier on consumption is high, there
is a sharp increase in aggregate demand that pushes relative prices
Pw
t
Pt up and which
translates into higher impact multipliers on hours per worker. Interestingly, a positive
government expenditure shock always produces a positive multiplier in terms of vacan-
cies and employment (negative multiplier for unemployment). In this case, the impact
multiplier function is very similar for a high and low loan-to-value and very ﬂat for a
share of borrowers lower than 0.4. This happens because vacancy posting at period t
and hence (un)employment depend crucially on expectations about tomorrow’s relativeHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 28




















































































Pt+1 = mct+1) and labor costs (wt+1l1t+1), which are very similar for high and low
loan-to-value ratios, except when the share of borrowers in the economy is high enough.
Regarding housing prices, we observe a fall following the ﬁscal expansion in all cases.
However, the effect is stronger for high loan-to-value ratios and especially so as the share
of borrowers rises. The explanation for this ﬁnding can be found in the reaction of the
real interest rate, which increases more strongly when both mb and tb are high. This
encourages savers to postpone current consumption and reduces the demand for houses.
All the previous results refer to impact multipliers, which are the most commonly
used in the literature. Recently Uhlig (2010) has argued that short run multipliers can be
misleading. Thus, in ﬁgure A.1 (Appendix 2) we check the sensitivity of our results to
calculate the present value ﬁscal multipliers at four and twenty quarters13, and we ﬁnd a
similar pattern for them to the impact multiplier.
5.3 Fiscal multipliers, price stickiness and persistence.
The ﬁscal multiplier also depends on other characteristics of the economy that interact
with the magnitude of the ﬁnancial friction. Here we study two such features that have
received special attention in the literature. First, the effect of the degree of price stickiness,
the relevance of which in explaining the business cycle properties of the US economy has
been analyzed in a search and matching framework by Krause and Lubik (2007). Second,
the effect of the persistence of the shock, which is a key policy parameter that deter-
mines the effects on economic activity of expansionary or consolidation ﬁscal packages
and which has been studied by Harms (2002), Galí et al. (2007) and Mayer, Moyen and
Stähler (2010), among others.
Figure 3 represents the impact multipliers as a function of the price rigidity para-
meter (w) for the benchmark calibration of the share of borrowers (0.36) and for the two
regimes related to the loan-to-value ratio. The ﬁrst important result is that the impact mul-
tipliers for high and low loan-to-value ratios are very similar when the value of w is lower
than 0.5. Second, the impact multipliers become stronger as price stickiness increases
above the 0.5 threshold, in particular in an economy with high mb. Therefore, in highly
leveraged economies these multipliers can be considerably higher than in low leveraged
economies if price rigidity is important. Third, the model is able to generate a crowding-
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in in consumption (and a Keynesian output multiplier) for values of the price rigidity
parameter higher than 0.6 (when mb = 0.985) or higher than 0.8 (when mb = 0.735).
Fourth, the vacancies and (un)employment multipliers are always positive (negative) for
any degree of price rigidity.
The main intuition behind all these results is that increasing price rigidity weakens
the positive response of the expected real interest rate and cushions the reduction in the
marginal cost in the next period
Pw
t+1
Pt+1 (as compared to its current value). The former effect
dampens the fall in lenders’ consumption and housing prices. As the borrowing capacity
of impatient households depends on the value of their collateral, the milder reaction of
housing prices also helps to increase the consumption of borrowers (in comparison to
an economy with larger swings in asset prices). The latter effect, i.e. that related to the
behavior of relative prices
Pw
t+1
Pt+1, explains why vacancies and employment increase by more
with price rigidity.
Figure 4 presents the effects of the degree of persistence of ﬁscal shocks on the
impact multipliers of the variables of interest. In keeping with previous ﬁgures, results
are shown for a high and low loan-to-value ratio while keeping our benchmark calibration
for the share of borrowers and the degree of price rigidity. As can be seen, in an economy
with a low loan-to-value ratio and, thus, with limited indebtedness capacity of impatient
consumers, aggregate consumption impact multipliers are always negative and do not
vary notably with the degree of persistence of ﬁscal shocks. This crowding-out effect on
consumption results in output multipliers that are always lower than 1 in this scenario.
For a high mb the effects of the persistence of ﬁscal policy are more visible. In general
the multipliers obtained in a high leverage regime are more pronounced than those for
a low leverage regime, whatever the value of the persistence parameter. However, the
value of the multipliers in both regimes tends to converge when the ﬁscal stimulus is
highly persistent. In other words, when mb = 0.985, consumption, output, wage and
hours multipliers decrease substantially with the degree of persistence, whereas vacancies
and employment multipliers increase. Thus, when rg is close to one, multipliers are very
similar in both leverage regimes.
In order to understand the economics behind these results, we have to once again
appeal to the reactions in real interest rates
rn
t +1




of persistence of ﬁscal shocks affects the consumption of savers in the same manner as in
Galí et. al (2007): higher persistence is associated with stronger negative wealth effects
that lower consumption. In our model, there is an additional mechanism at work, which
operates mainly through the consumption of indebted households. Higher persistence of
ﬁscal policy means that public expenditure will remain high tomorrow, implying persis-







































































































































































Figure 4: Impact multiplier as a function of the shock persistenceHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 33
erode the borrowing and consumption capacities of impatient households and also result
in lower aggregate output and consumption multipliers.
What happens in the labor market? First, the mechanism explained above, opera-
ting through the marginal utility of consumption, is responsible for reducing the impact
multipliers on wages and hours when persistence increases. Second, a more persistent
government spending shock implies that aggregate demand in t + 1 remains higher and
thus, relative prices will fall less tomorrow, improving the willingness of ﬁrms to posting
vacancies. As a consequence, if ﬁscal policy is more persistent in a high leveraged eco-
nomy, the impact multipliers of employment and unemployment are greater in absolute
value14.
5.4 Keynesian ﬁscal multipliers?
In this section we present some additional results about the impact output multiplier in
terms of the interaction of three key parameters in our model. Figure 5 shows the values of
the output multiplier as a function of the share of borrowers and the degree of persistence
of the ﬁscal shock, keeping price rigidity at the benchmark value and mb = 0.985. In the
ﬁrst panel in the top of the ﬁgure, we depict a tridimensional plot showing the value of
the multiplier along the two dimensions. In particular, we are interested in the parameter
combinations that deliver a ﬁscal multiplier on output greater than one (Keynesian mul-
tiplier). In the second panel of the ﬁgure we represent contours of the previous ﬁgure
for three different values of the output multiplier (0.9, 1.0 and 1.1). As is clear from this
graph, a Keynesian multiplier can be obtained for a wide range of combinations of number
of borrowers and government spending shock persistence. For instance, if the share of
borrowers is higher than 0.4, we obtain a multiplier higher than one regardless of the
degree of persistence. However, if the share of borrowers is around 0.25, we need shock
persistence to be lower than 0.6 to obtain the Keynesian multiplier. The last panel in the
ﬁgure displays similar contours, but now from a tridimensional picture for an economy
with lower borrowing capacity (mb = 0.735). As we can see, in this case there are no
combinations of reasonable values of both parameters that generate Keynesian output
multipliers.
Figure 6 depicts the impact multipliers that result from the interaction among the
share of borrowers and the degree of price rigidity. We keep persistence at its baseline
value. As a general result, for parameters of price rigidity higher than 0.8 we always
obtain Keynesian output multipliers, as can be observed in the contour plots in the lower
panels of Figure 6. Interestingly, changes in the share of borrowers only affect the values of
14 A sensitivity analysis of the results in this subsection to the time span considered to calculate the ﬁscal
multipliers can be found in Figures A.2 and A.3 in Appendix 2.HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 34
the output multiplier if the price rigidity parameter is above a threshold near 0.6. The com-
bination of a very high loan-to-value ratio with high price rigidity and a large proportion
of constrained consumers causes the ﬁscal multiplier to skyrocket.
Finally, Figure 7 analyzes the effect of alternative combinations of the persistence of
the shock and price stickiness on output multipliers, keeping the share of borrowers at its
standard level. The graphs show that a price rigidity parameter roughly above 0.75 always
generates a Keynesian multiplier whatever the persistence of the ﬁscal shock. Moreover,
when price rigidity is approximately above 0.6, increasing the persistence of the shock
reduces the value of the multiplier. However, the opposite is true when prices are very
ﬂexible. In that case higher persistence contributes to increase the multiplier. Again, in
the low leverage regime (mb = 0.735), persistence does not interact with price rigidity to
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Figure 7: Impact ﬁscal multiplier as a function of persistence and price rigidityHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 38
5.5 Fiscal consolidation and borrowing capacity.
In this section we use our model to examine the effects of ﬁscal consolidation driven by a
cut in public expenditure under two different scenarios regarding the borrowing capacity
of households. We also consider two alternative strategies about the path followed by
the government to reduce spending. In the ﬁrst, the government reduces spending by
little in the present, but announces that it will be reduced by more in the future. In
the second, it is assumed that most of the government spending reduction takes place
in the ﬁrst periods. Using Hall’s words (see Hall, 2009) we name the ﬁrst scenario as
a "back-loading consolidation strategy" and the second as a "front-loading consolidation
strategy"15. In both cases we assume that the total cut in government expenditure is the
same, although the timing along a period of ﬁve years is quite different. More precisely,
and to stick to real numbers, we simulate a ﬁve-year back-loaded ﬁscal consolidation,
whichistheinverseoftheﬁscalstimulusintheAmericanRecoveryandReinvestmentAct,
as calculated by Cogan et. al. (2010, Figure 2). In the case of the front-loaded consolidation
strategy, government expenditure reductions follow an autorregressive pattern, with our
benchmark persistence parameter rg = 0.75.
Figure 8 depicts the temporal pattern of government spending cuts for the two
scenarios considered quarterly. We feed our model with each of the strategies displayed in
the ﬁgure and calculate the effects on GDP under our two values of the loan-to-value ratio
(mb = 0.985 and mb = 0.735). By comparing the results for both values of the loan-to-value
ratio we intend to establish the inﬂuence of the capacity of households to borrow on the
output effects of a ﬁscal consolidation.
Table 1 presents the results yearly. According to the panel on the left-hand side
of the table, when the ﬁscal consolidation follows a back-loading strategy, borrowing
opportunities in the economy do not seem to play an important role in the GDP effects
of the consolidation. However, when government follows a very aggressive strategy of
ﬁscal consolidation, reducing government spending a great deal in the initial quarters, the
effects on GDP are very dependent on households’ borrowing opportunities. In particular,
ﬁscal consolidation is less harmful under a low indebtedness capacity situation. After
ﬁve years, a ﬁscal consolidation in a situation of a low loan-to-value ratio saves around
0.7 percent of lost GDP, with respect to scenario of high indebtedness capacity. Finally,
the results also indicate that in a situation of low borrowing (low loan-to-value ratio) the
front-loading strategy is less harmful than hypothetical back-loaded policy.
15 The question of delays in government spending is also a central point in Leeper et al (2010).HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 39
























Figure 8: Back-loaded ﬁscal consolidation and front-loaded ﬁscal consolidation





Year Reduction1 in gt Effect2 on GDP Reduction1 in gt Effect2 on GDP
Low mb High mb Low mb High mb
2012 -0.44 -1.12 -1.00 -1.29 -3.44 -3.72
2013 -0.76 -1.68 -1.68 -0.44 -0.56 -0.72
2014 -0.47 -0.88 -0.88 -0.14 -0.16 -0.28
2015 -0.23 -0.36 -0.40 -0.04 -0.04 -0.12
2016 -0.14 -0.28 -0.36 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04
Sum -2.03 -4.32 -4.32 -2.03 -4.21 -4.88
1As a percentage of yearly GDP. 2Accumulated gains (percent of initial GDP).
5.6 Fiscal policy and a credit crunch.
Finally, we use our model to evaluate the capacity of ﬁscal policy to affect the economy in
a situation where private agents are forced into deleveraging due to a credit crunch. To
this end, we endogenize the loan-to-value ratio as mb
t = (1 + #m
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with parameters fm
1 = 1.83 and fm
2 = ￿0.836, and initial conditions for #m
t￿1 and #m
t￿2
equal zero. Starting from a high indebtedness capacity in the economy (mb = 0.985)
and nm
t = 0, the loan-to-value ratio is temporarily reduced according to two different
magnitudes of the initial shock. In the ﬁrst case (the slashed line in Figure 9), we hit the
AR(2) process reducing nm
t by a one percentage point of mb. This generates a maximum
reduction of approximately 4 percentage points of mb after 10 quarters, returning very
slowly afterwards to the initial value. We call this shock pattern a situation of mild credit
crunch. In the second case (dotted line in Figure 9), the initial fall in mb amounts to 4
percent, the loan-to-value ratio reaching a minimum value of 0.8. We call this scenario a
severe credit crunch16.
In order to isolate the effects of ﬁscal policy on relevant macroeconomic variables,
we run two simulations for each of the two credit crunch scenarios described above. First,
we simulate the effects on variables when we add the credit crunch to a (one percent of
GDP) positive ﬁscal shock. We obtain the response of the variables as relative deviations
from their steady-state values (
￿
xt
x )f,cc. The impact effects corresponding to the previous
response in the initial period are displayed in columns 2B and 2C in Table 2. Second, we
obtain the response in the case of only a credit crunch shock (
￿
xt
x )cc (see columns 3B and
3C in Table 2 for the initial impact). The net effect of ﬁscal policy is then computed as










. Columns 1B and 1C in Table 2
capture the initial impacts of this net effect, which should be compared with column 1A,
representing the net effects of ﬁscal policy when the credit crunch shock is absent.
In Figure 10 we perform the same comparison between the net effects of ﬁscal
policy for a time span of 10 quarters. The main message stemming from this exercise
is that ﬁscal policy in the presence of a severe credit crunch can still generate positive and
signiﬁcant effects on consumption and output as suggested, for example, in Eggertsson
and Krugman (2010). However, the net effects of ﬁscal policy on these variables do not
augment with the intensity of the deleveraging effort in the economy. This is so despite
the net effect of government spending on borrowers’ debt, house prices and the stock
of houses favoring consumption expenditure the more intense the credit crunch is. The
intuition that public spending impulses can help to prevent a more intense deterioration
of the net worth in the presence of a severe contraction of private credit is conﬁrmed by
the results in Figure 10. However, this is insufﬁcient to ensure a stronger response from
borrower consumption and output due to the reaction of labor income and especially real
wages and hours worked. The net multiplier is, if anything, somewhat smaller the worse
16 As pointed out by Eggertsson and Krugman (2010), when the economy sufferers a rapid period of private
deleveraging it can easily run into the zero bound for the interest rate. This exercise has been designed so that
the nominal interest rate does not hit the zero bound in any of the periods considered.HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 41
the deterioration of credit conditions in the economy17. Interestingly, the extensive margin
of employment reacts more positively to the ﬁscal shock the more severe the credit crunch
is. This is so because ﬁscal policy does not affect real wages as much in this case, which in
turn moderates the (negative) impact on vacancy posting. Hence, although the differential
output effect of ﬁscal stimuli in the event of a sharp credit contraction does not show up
in this model, this policy can play a more important role in sustaining employment in a
creditless slump.
















Figure 9: Three credit crunch scenarios
17 Note, however, that our experiment abstracts from reaching the zero bound, in which case ﬁscal policy can
recover vitality, as Chrsitiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2009) or Woodford (2010) show.HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 42
TABLE 2 ￿ IMPACT EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY
UNDER A CREDIT CRUNCH
No Credit Crunch Low Credit Crunch High Credit Crunch
Variable (1A) (1B) (2B) (3B) (1C) (2C) (3C)
Consumption 1.13 0.95 -3.37 -4.32 0.65 -13.84 -14.49
Output 1.57 1.48 -0.74 -2.22 1.33 -6.18 -7.51
Total Hours(￿) 2.29 2.25 0.21 -2.05 2.18 -5.17 -7.35
Real Wage 2.14 1.78 -3.23 -5.01 1.12 -14.91 -16.03
House Prices -0.39 -0.34 -1.02 -0.68 -0.26 -2.98 -2.72
Real Interest (bp) 3.50 7.74 -11.17 -12.75 19.13 -40.31 -38.86
Inﬂation (bp) 30.25 26.68 -27.81 -54.49 20.75 -149.9 -170.6
Borrow. Debt -0.21 -0.13 -3.62 -3.49 0.04 -14.22 -14.26
(1A), (1B) and (1C): Net Effects of Fiscal Shock.
(2B) and (2C): Fiscal shock and Credit Crunch.
(3B) and (3C): Credit Crunch.
(*) The reduction in total hours is accompanied by a small positive reaction of employment after the credit crunch.HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 43





















































































Figure 10: Net effects of ﬁscal policy under a credit crunchHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 44
6. Conclusions
Fiscal policy multipliers are small in neo-Keynesian models with many Ricardian features.
The intertemporal substitution mechanisms wipes out the expansionary effects of ﬁscal
stimuli depressing investment and consumption. Alternatively, models with consumers
that do not participate in the ﬁnancial market (RoT) are capable of producing strong ﬁscal
responses of output. Unfortunately these models have two major ﬂaws, one in terms of the
assumptions made and the other empirical. These models overlook an important feature
of modern economies in which many households do not base their consumption decisions
either on the basis of their permanent income or of their labor income only, since they have
limited but non-zero borrowing capacity. This implies that some of these agents carry a
given amount of debt and presumably some asset holdings, that affect their consumption
possibilities. The current recession after a period of easy ﬁnancial conditions that has
caught many households highly leveraged is a good case in point. On empirical grounds
and under fairly general conditions, the RoT model fails to deliver theoretical impulse
responses of vacancies and employment to ﬁscal shocks consistent with those in the data.
In this paper we augment the search and matching model with a proportion of total
households that are more impatient than others who borrow up to a limit given by the
expected collateral value of their asset (housing) holdings. The interaction between the
consumption decisions of agents with limited access to credit and the process of wage
bargaining and vacancy posting delivers three main results: (a) higher initial leverage
makes it more likely to ﬁnd output multipliers higher than one; (b) a positive government
expenditure shock always produces a positive multiplier for vacancies and employment;
(c)output(employment)multipliersdecrease(increase)markedlywiththedegreeofshock
persistence and increase with the degree of price stickiness. We carry out two simple
exercises with our model and ﬁnd that: ﬁrst, the GDP cost of ﬁscal consolidations is, if
anything, higher when the loan-to-value ratio is also high; and second, the use of ﬁscal
stimuli can partially counteract the negative effect on output of a credit crunch, but the
ﬁscal multiplier (net of the deleveraging effect) does not increase, and even falls, with
the severity of the credit crunch. Finally, the presence of an intensive and an extensive
margin of employment in the model explains why many of the factors that weaken the
output response to increases in government spending shocks do in many cases reinforce
the (un)employment multipliers.HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 45
Appendix 1: Derivation of the borrowers’ consumption function









































































































































































































which states that borrowers’ consumption is a function of the networth and the current



























Using the negotiated wage equation (48) one can represent the labor income as a
function of consumption and other variables. Let write this relationship as
wtl1tnt￿1 ￿ cb
t H(.) (1.12)HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 47




































































In order the guess (1.10) to be veriﬁed
Q(.) =
￿




















Given that equation (1.13) is an approximation to the real consumption function,
in Figure A.0 we have depicted the impulse-response functions to a (one per cent of
GDP) transitory public expenditure shock of borrowers consumption and the sum of labor
income and net worth these consumers. As can be seen, our approximation is quite exact
in the case of a high loan-to-value-ration, while there is a certain gap in a low loan-to-value
scenario.HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 48










Labor income + NW (high m)
Borrow. Consump. (high m)
Labor income + NW (low m)
Borrow. Consump. (low m)
Figure A.0: Response of labor income, net worth and borrowers consumption to a ﬁscal shock.HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 49
Appendix 2: One-year and ﬁve-year multipliers




















































































One-year multiplier as a function of the share of borrowers




















































































Five-year multiplier as a function of the share of borrowers
Figure A.1: Multipliers as a function of the share of borrowersHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 50





















































































One-year multiplier as a function of price rigidity
















































































Five-year multiplier as a function of price rigidity
Figure A.2: Multipliers as a function of price rigidityHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 51





















































































One-year multiplier as a function of the shock persistence



















































































Five-year multiplier as a function of the shock persistence
Figure A.3: Multipliers as a function of the shock persistenceHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGE AND FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 52
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